The daemon has always listened on 8444 and nothing published it, so every
node built from this image was outbound-only. Publishing it is now a
documented choice rather than an omission -- including the two things that
are not obvious from the config: peers are told the port from `port` in
keys.dat rather than the one you mapped it to (so only 8444:8444 works),
and the node's own address is never configured at all, because every peer
replaces the hardcoded 127.0.0.1 in the version message with the IP it
sees on the socket.
An open port needs a brake, hence BITMESSAGE_MAXTOTALCONNECTIONS. It
defaults to the PyBitmessage stock 200, so nothing changes for existing
users of the image. The key is inserted when the stock config lacks it
instead of trusting the substitution: the PyBitmessage clone is unpinned,
and a silent no-op would ship a node that looks capped and is not.
The API port in the example compose moves to loopback, which is what the
README already prescribed.
The sed pass that configures the daemon punished anyone setting a strong
password: '&' in a replacement means the whole match, so a password
containing one was silently rewritten into something else, and the '|'
delimiter made sed exit with 'unknown option to s'. Every setting rode in
one invocation and the script had no set -e, so that failure applied none
of them -- not apipassword, not apienabled, not apiinterface -- and the
daemon came up on whatever it had before without saying so.
esc() now escapes backslash, '&' and the delimiter via printf. The
expressions are anchored to the start of the line and name their key in the
replacement instead of using \1, so no backreference is involved and
nothing in another section can match. keys.dat also holds privsigningkey
and privencryptionkey for this node's Bitmessage identities; editing in
place leaves every byte outside [bitmessagesettings] untouched, which is
why this stays a line edit rather than a parse-and-rewrite.
The clients needed the other half of this: credentials go into an XML-RPC
URL, where '@' splits the userinfo and '#' truncates the rest, so a strong
password wrote correctly and still failed to connect. Both now
percent-encode. A '%' in the password remains unusable -- it breaks
PyBitmessage's own config reader and every API call returns 500.
Also here, all found while making the above safe:
- set -eu, with the keys.dat chown guarded. A misconfiguration now stops
the container instead of passing unnoticed.
- The seed-address retry loop used bash brace expansion under CMD ["sh"],
where /bin/sh is dash and {1..4} is a literal, so it ran once, not four
times.
- apt-get update shared a layer with nothing, letting a cached update feed
install months-stale package lists.
- HEALTHCHECK gained a start period; the startup VACUUM takes tens of
seconds on a large messages.dat and the container reported unhealthy for
all of it.
- Removed the AppImage systemd unit, AppArmor profile and updater script.
Nothing referenced them -- not the image, the deployment or the ansible
roles -- and the updater fetched a binary with no signature or checksum
check.